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Abstract—Reliable Broadcast (RB) is a basic abstraction in 
distributed systems, because it allows processes to communi-
cate consistently and reliably to each other. It guarantees that 
all correct process reliable deliver the same set of messages. 
This abstraction has been extensively investigated in distributed 
systems where all processes have different identifiers, and the 
communication channels are reliable. However, more and more 
anonymous systems appear due to the motivation of privacy. It 
is significant to extend RB into anonymous system model where 
each process has no identifier. In another hand, the requirement 
of reliable communication channels is not always satisfied in real 
systems. Henee, this paper is aimed to study RB abstraction in 
anonymous distributed systems with fair lossy communication 
channels. 
In distributed systems, symmetry always mean that two sys-
tems should be considered symmetric if they behave identically, 
and two components of a system should be considered symmetric 
if they are indistinguishable. Henee, the anonymous distributed 
systems is symmetry. The design difficulty of RB algorithm lies 
in how to break the symmetry of the system. In this paper, 
we propose to use a random function to break it. Firstly, a 
non-quiescent RB algorithm tolerating an arbitrary number of 
crashed processes is given. Then, we introduce an anonymous 
perfect failure detector AP*. Finally, we propose an extended 
and quiescent RB algorithm using AP*. 
Index Terms—Anonymous distributed system, asynchronous 
system, reliable broadcast, fair lossy communication channels, 
failure detector, quiescent. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reliable Broadcast (RB) is a fundamental service in 
distributed systems that helps to build reliable distributed 
applications. It is used to disseminate messages among a set 
of processes with RB-broadcast() and RB-deliver() operations, 
which was introduced in [1]. In short, RB is a broadcast service 
that requires all non-crashed processes deliver the same set of 
messages, and that all messages sent by non-crashed processes 
must be delivered by all non-crashed processes. 
This service as has been extensively studied in classic 
distributed systems, Le., in which each process has a unique 
identifier ([2], [3], [4]). On the other hand, this study in anony-
mous distributed systems, Le., processes have no identifiers 
and are programmed identically [5], has few result. In [6], 
the RB abstraction has been studied in anonymous distributed 
systems with reliable communication channels. Anonymity is a 
new and challenging point in distributed computing. In classic 
message-passing distributed systems, processes communicate 
with each other by passing messages. Because they all have 
unique identifiers, senders can choose the recipients of their 
messages, and recipients are aware of the identities of the 
senders of messages they receive [7]. However, all these rules 
have to be changed in anonymous distributed systems. In 
anonymous systems, when a process receives a message, it 
can not distinguish this message comes from which sender. 
The difficulty in the design of any distributed algorithms 
in anonymous systems lies in how to break the symmetry 
of system, Le., how to distinguish messages from the same 
process or different processes. In the literature, there are 
three main methods used to break symmetry in anonymous 
distributed systems: randomization [8], leader election [9], and 
direction sensitive [10]. Informally, randomization means that 
there is a random function subject to a distribution which is 
used to give random ñame to each process; leader election 
is a deterministic form of symmetry breaking that an elected 
leader can assign ñames to processes, count the number of 
processes of the system, etc.; direction sensitive refers to that 
each process has local port number, it senses the message 
received or sent from/to which port. 
The development of anonymous distributed systems is very 
quick. In general, this trend is caused by two important 
reasons: privacy and practical constraints. In some distributed 
applications, like peer-to-peer file systems, users do not want 
to be identified [11]. Other applications that use sensor net-
works has constraints in where a unique identity is not possible 
to be included in each sensor node (due, for example, to 
small storage capacity, reduced computational capacity, or a 
huge number of elements to be identified) [12]. As we have 
known, the first paper studied about anonymous systems was 
addressed by D . Angluin [13]. Then, lots of paper appeared 
in this field, as ring anonymous networks, and shared memory 
anonymous systems ([14], [15], [16], [17]). 
Moreover, the study of R B (no matter in classic or anony-
mous distributed systems) usually assume that the communi-
cation channels are reliable (if a process p sends a message 
to a process q, and both p and q are correct, then q eventually 
receives m). However, most of the communication channels 
in real systems are unreliable (e.g., fair lossy, which means 
that if a message is sent an arbitrary but finite number of 
times, then there is no guarantee on its reception, because 
the channel can lose an infinite number of messages [18]). In 
this regard, several works have addressed the issue of how to 
construct reliable channels over unreliable channels in classic 
distributed systems [18], [19]. To the best of our knowledge, 
R B has not been studied in anonymous distributed systems 
with unreliable channels. 
Our Contributions This is paper is devoted to the implemen-
tation of Reliable Broadcast abstraction in anonymous asyn-
chronous message-passing systems that processes are crash 
prone and communication channels are fair lossy. We have 
two main contributions: 
The paper proves that Reliable Broadcast abstraction can 
• 
be implemented in anonymous asynchronous system with 
fair lossy communication channels and any number of 
correct processes. Two implementation algorithms (non-
quiescent and quiescent) and corresponding proofs are 
given in this paper. Besides, in these algorithms, every 
process is not necessary to know the total number of 
processes in the systems. 
A new class of anonymous failure detector AP is 
• 
proposed. This failure detector outputs a set of paris of 
label and number, where the label represents a temporal 
identifier of a process ( I D is used in the failure detector 
layer) and the number represents the number of pro-
cesses who have known this label (in the failure detector 
layer). The information of correct processes from this 
AP is used to make the Reliable Broadcast algorithm 
to be quiescent. 
Roadmap This paper is organized as follows. The system 
model and several definitions are presented in Section 2. One 
non-quiescent algorithm is proposed in section 3 to implement 
Reliable Broadcast abstraction in the model of anonymous 
asynchronous systems with fair lossy channels. In Section 4, 
a new class of failure detector AP is defined firstly, then a 
quiescent Reliable Broadcast implementation algorithm with 
AP is given. Finally, this paper is concluded by the Section 
5. 
I I . SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS 
In this paper, an anonymous asynchronous system is con-
sidered as a system in which processes have no identifiers and 
communicate with each other via fair lossy communication 
channels. Two primitives are used in this system to send and 
receive messages: bwadcast() and receive(). We say that a 
process PÍ broadcasts a message m to all processes (including 
itself) when it invokes broadcasti(m); a process pi receives 
a message m when it invokes receivei(m). Note that in 
an anonymous distributed system, when a process receives 
a message m it cannot determine who is the sender of m. 
Finally, we assume that there is a global clock whose valúes 
are natural numbers, but processes cannot access it. 
Process A l l processes are anonymous, that means they have 
no identiflers and execute the same algorithm. Furthermore, 
all processes are asynchronous, that is, there is no assumption 
on their respective speeds. In this paper, the anonymous 
distributed system is constituted by a set of n anonymous 
processes, denoted as I I = {pi}i=ii...in, such that its size is | I I | 
= n. We consider that i(í < i < n) is the index of each process 
of the system. This index cannot be known by processes, it 
is just used as a notation to simplify the description of the 
algorithm. 
There is a global clock T whose valúes are positive natural 
numbers. Note that T is an auxiliary concept that we only use 
it for notation, but processes cannot check or modify it. 
Failure model A process stops to execute the algorithm 
any more is crashed. A process that does not crash in a run is 
corred in that run, otherwise it is faulty. We use Corred 
to denote the set of correct processes in a run, and Faulty 
to denote the set of faulty processes. A process executes its 
algorithm correctly until it crashes. A crashed process can not 
execute any more statements or recover. 
Communication Each pair of processes are connected by 
bidirectional fair lossy communication channels. A commu-
nication channel between two processes p and q is called as 
fair lossy communication channel i f it satisfles the following 
properties [20]: 
• Fairness: I f p sends a message m to q an infinite number 
of times and q is correct, then q eventually receives m 
from p. 
• Uniform Integrity: I f q receives a message m from p, then 
p previously sent m to </; and i f q receives m infinitely 
often from p, then p sends m infinitely often to q. 
Processes communicate among them by sending and receiv-
ing messages through these channels. We assume that these 
channels neither duplicate ñor créate messages, but may lost 
messages. 
Reliable Broadcast Reliable Broadcast is one type of fault-
tolerant broadcast service in distributed systems. It requires 
that all correct processes deliver the same set of messages, and 
that all messages sent by correct processes must be delivered 
to all correct processes. Formally, reliable broadcast is defined 
by two primitives: RB_broadcast(m) and RB_deliver(m). 
They satisfy three properties as follows: 
• Validity: I f a correct process broadcasts a message m, 
then it eventually delivers m. 
• Agreement: I f a correct process delivers a message m, 
then all correct processes eventually deliver m. 
• Uniform Integrity: For any message m, every process 
delivers m at most once, and only i f m was previously 
broadcast by a process. 
Note that Validity and Agreement imply that all correct pro-
cesses deliver all the messages broadcast by correct processes. 
Failure Detector The failure detector is a module that pro-
vides each process a read-only local variable containing failure 
information (may be unreliable) of processes. The notion of 
failure detector is proposed and developed by Chandra and 
Toueg in their seminal paper [21]. The failure detector is 
deflned by the completeness and accuracy properties. A failure 
detector history H is a function from 11x7 to 2 n . H(p, t) is 
the valué of the failure detector module of process p at time 
t. I f q G H(p, t), it means that p suspects q at time t in H. 
Each process has access to its local failure detector for ob-
taining failure information of processes. They can be divided 
into different classes according to the quality of information 
they give. A failure detector can make mistakes by wrongly 
suspect a running process as a crashed one or does not 
suspect a really crashed process. Henee, the failure detector 
may repeatedly trust or suspect one process. This character 
of failure detector implies that any two failure detector of 
different processes may provide different failure information. 
Notation The system model is denotedby either AAS_Fn¡t[$] 
or AAS_Fnt[D]. AAS_F is an acronym for anonymous 
asynchronous message passing distributed system with fair 
lossy communication channels; 0 means that there is no 
additional assumption, while D means that the system is 
enriched with a failure detector of class D. The variable n 
represents the total number of processes in the system, and t 
represents the máximum number of processes that can crash. 
I I I . I M P L E M E N T I N G R E L I A B L E BROADCAST I N 
AAS_Fn¡t0] 
In this section, we present an algorithm implementing 
Reliable Broadcast abstraction in anonymous asynchronous 
systems with fair lossy communication channels. This algo-
rithm can run independently of the number of faulty processes. 
In anonymous systems, processes have no identiflers making 
the design of Reliable Broadcast algorithm very difflcult. In 
order to solve this difflculty, we summarize the main challenge 
flrstly. It is well known that each message can be identifled 
by both the identifler of its sender and a sequence number 
in elassie systems. However, in anonymous systems, it is 
impossible to use the identifler of process (because processes 
do not have identiflers) or to distinguish all identical messages 
only by a sequence number (because different process may 
use the same one). I f a process receives a message, it does 
not know where it comes from. The obvious idea, like most 
works in the literature, is to assign an identifler to each process, 
and then run the algorithm of eponymous distributed systems. 
In fact, this method has broken the anonymity of the system 
that a process can be tracked by its message flow. Because 
a flxed identifler is attached to all messages RB-broadcast by 
one process. The possibility of successful tracking is elevated 
by the Big Data and Cloud Computing technologies. This 
has been conflrmed by the state of the art research result of 
MIT [22]. In another words, the anonymity gained by the way 
of hiding the identiflers of processes is not real anonymity. 
Then, we give a deflnition of anonymity: 
In distributed systems, anonymity means that processes have 
no identifler, and also means that the relationship between 
messages and their senders are unknown and untrackable. 
According to this deflnition, the system is not really anony-
mous if identiflers are assigned to processes that the relation-
ships between message and its sender can be tracked. 
In fact, to handle the design difflculty of Reliable Broad-
cast algorithm in anonymous systems without breaking the 
anonymity, we do not necessarily need the identiflers of 
processes or assign identiflers to them. Instead, what we 
really need is the capability to make every message in the 
system to be unique (break the symmetry of systems). In 
this paper, we propose that each process manages a random 
function to assign a unique one-time label to each message. 
When one process reliable broadeasts a message, the local 
random function of this process generates a random number 
which wi l l be piggybacked as a label (denoted by tag) to this 
message. Note that, this unique label wi l l neither be used as an 
address for sending messages ñor to identify a certain process. 
Moreover, it is assumed that neither one random function 
ñor two can genérate identical label assigned to two different 
messages. 
Though the probability of assigning a unique label to each 
message is very high, this assignment does not break the 
anonymity of the system that no process knows the mapping 
relationship between a tag and a process. Moreover, according 
the result of [10] and [23], a simple probabilistic analysis using 
a well known “birthday paradox” shows that the probability 
of a colusión is nearly zero if 100 concurrent processes in a 
very large-scale system draw from a 128-bit fleld. Following 
this result, processes RB-broadcast messages with an identical 
label in one instance is really low. Moreover, in order to 
avoid the colusión in different instances, each process has a 
variable to record the last sequence number of the message 
broadcast by itself. With these two parts, a process flrst draw 
a random number, then piggyback a sequence number obtained 
by increasing the last sequence number by 1. 
Figure 1 presents the algorithm in detail, each process owns 
a random function random() which is used to assign a unique 
tag to every message before to broadcast it. In order to 
facilítate the description, let’s consider a process PÍ (index 
i is used just for description, no process knows which process 
is PÍ, even itself). 
Description of the algorithm: 
Every process PÍ manages two local sets: 
• MSGi, which records all messages either broadcast or 
received by PÍ . 
• RB_DELIVEREDi, which records all messages reli-
1 Initialization 
2 sets M S G i , R B D E L I V E R E D i empty 
3 activate Task 1 
4 When R B broadcast i(m) is executed 
5 tag random i ( ) 
6 insert (m, tag) into M S G i 
7 When rece ive i (MSG, m, tag) is executed 
8 if (m, tag) is not in M S G i then 
9 insert (m, tag) into M S G i 
10 end if 
11 if (m, tag) is not in R B D E L I V E R E D i then 
12 insert (m, tag) into R B D E L I V E R E D i 
13 R B del iver i (m) 
14 end if 
Task 1 : 
15 repeat forever 
16 for every message (m, tag) in M S G i do 
17 broadcast i (MSG, m, tag) 
18 end for 
19 end repeat 
Figure 1. Reliable Broadcast in AAS Fn,t[∅] (code of p i) 
ably delivered by p i. 
The algorithm works as follows: 
Initially, MSG i and RB DELIV ERED i are set to 
empty, and Task 1 is activated (lines 1-3). When p i calls 
RB broadcasti(m) (line 4), its random i() generates a ran-
dom tag for m firstly (line 5). Then, p i inserts (m, tag) into 
MSG i (line 6), so that m will be broadcast periodically to all 
processes in Task 1 (lines 15-19). 
When receivei(MSG, m, tag) is executed (line 7), p i 
inserts (m, tag) into MSG i if this is the first reception 
of m (lines 8-10). Then, p i checks whether m has already 
been delivered or not (line 11). If not, p i inserts m into 
RB DELIV ERED i and then reliably delivers it (lines 12-
13). 
In Task 1, every message in MSG i is periodically broadcast 
by p i in order to overcome the message losses caused by the 
fair lossy communication channels. 
Correctness Proof: 
Lemma 1: If a correct process RB broadcast a message m, 
then it eventually RB deliver m. (Validity) 
Proof: Let us consider a non-fault process p i ( i is 
used for description, no process knows which process is p i) 
that invokes RB broadcast(m). It firstly generates a unique 
random number as a tag to this message m (Line 5), then 
inserts (m, tag) into its set MSG i to broadcast it to all 
processes (included itself) (Lines 6, 15-19). For p i is correct, 
this Task 1 will execute forever to disseminate m (broadcast 
infinite times). Then, together with the fairness property of fair 
lossy communication channels, p i will receive m eventually 
(by itself). Because this is the first reception of m and m has 
not been RB delivered before by p i, p i RB deliver() m 
one time(Lines 11-14). We finish the proof of this Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2: If a correct process RB deliver a message m, 
then all correct process eventually RB deliver m. (Agree-
ment) 
Proof: Let us assume, by the way of contradiction, that 
the claim is not true. It means that if a correct process p i has 
delivered a message m, then, eventually there exists at least 
one correct process does not deliver it. 
We suppose that p i has Rb delivered m. According to the 
algorithm (Line 6), m must be inserted into the set MSG i by 
p i when RB broadcasti(m) is called before RB deliver() 
it. And p i is a correct process, it executes Task 1 forever to 
broadcast every message (including (m, tag)) that existed in 
its set MSG i to all processes (Lines 15-19). According to the 
property of fair lossy communication channel, if a message is 
broadcast an infinite times by a correct process, this message 
must be received by one correct process eventually. If the 
assumption is correct that there exists one correct process 
does not deliver m which means that this correct process does 
not receive m, then we get a contradiction here. Hence, the 
assumption is incorrect, and we complete the proof of Lemma 
2. 
Lemma 3: For any message m, every correct process 
RB deliver m at most once, and only if m was previously 
RB broadcast by sender(m). (Integrity) 
Proof: The second part of this lemma that any message 
m was previously RB broadcast by its sender is trivial, due 
to the fact that each process only forward messages it has 
received and fair lossy channels do not create, duplicate, or 
garble messages. 
Then, we focus on the proof of the first part of this lemma. It 
is supposed that each message has a unique tag, and together 
with that each process has a set RB DELIV ERED i to 
record all messages that have delivered (Line 12). Even though 
each message can be broadcast forever by correct processes 
and will be received by every correct process for infinite times 
(Lines 15-19), every message has to be checked whether it has 
already been RB delivered when it is received by a correct 
process. So, the set RB DELIV ERED i guarantees that no 
message m will be RB delivered more than once. We finish 
the proof of Lemma 3. 
Theorem 1 Algorithm 1 guarantees the property of reliable 
broadcast. 
Proof: According to Lemma 1, 2 and 3, it is trivial to see 
that Theorem 1 is correct. 
I V . IMPLEMENTING RELIABLE BROADCAST QUIESCENTLY 
I N AAS Fn,t[AP ] 
Observe that the algorithm of Figure 1 is non-quiescent due 
to the permanent periodical broadcast of received messages 
in Task 1. Hence, in this section we address the design 
of a quiescent algorithm implementing Reliable Broadcast. 
The approach followed consists in eventually deleting every 
message from the set MSG. According to the properties of 
Reliable Broadcast, the periodical broadcast of Task 1 could 
be safely terminated when all the messages RB delivered 
by any correct process have been received by all correct 
processes. In other words, we could delete a message from the 
set MSG when it has been received by all correct processes. 
Based on the previous, the design of a quiescent algorithm is 
reduced to the following two sub-problems: (i) determining the 
set of all correct processes in the system, and (ii) conflrming 
that a message has been received by all processes in this 
set. We wil l address the flrst sub-problem with a failure 
detector, and then use it to solve the second sub-problem 
algorithmically. 
A. Failure Detector AP* 
The failure detector abstraction, proposed by Chandra and 
Toueg [21], provides (possibly unreliable) failure information 
of processes. It is deflned by both completeness and accuracy 
properties. In non-anonymous distributed systems, the failure 
information is usually composed of the identiflers of processes. 
However, in anonymous distributed systems processes have 
no identiflers. Henee, the main difflculty in deflning a failure 
detector for anonymous distributed systems is how to give 
meaningful failure information about processes without iden-
tiflers. In this regard, we follow the approach of the failure 
detector ATi, introduced by Bonnet and Raynal [24], that 
assigns a random label to each process as a temporal identifler. 
This assignment neither break the anonymity of systems ñor 
reléase the information of the relationship between a message 
and its sender. Because failure detector is a sepárate modular 
and the assignment is deployed inside this modular. In other 
words, the mapping relationship of a process and a label is 
packed inside of the failure detector forever. 
As mentioned before, a process Pi can delete a message m 
from its MSGi when it has received acknowledge messages to 
this m from all correct processes. So, the failure detector has 
to output the information of all correct processes. It means that 
this failure detector must have a strong completeness property 
that eventually correct processes do not trust any process that 
crashes1, and a strong accuracy property that a process cannot 
be trusted once it is crashed (may be need a little time). 
We define a perfect anonymous failure detector AP* (the 
anonymous counterpart of Chandra-Toueg’s perfect failure 
detector P) that satisfies strong completeness (eventually all 
correct processes are permanently trusted by every correct 
process) and strong accuracy (eventually correct processes do 
not trust any process that has crashed). AP* provides each 
process pn with a read-only local variable a_p* that contains 
pairs (label, number), where label is a temporal identifler of 
a process and number is the number of correct processes who 
have known label. For example, i f process pj’s local variable 
a_p* contains {(labelo, number{), ..., (labeli, number i), ..., 
(labeln, numbern)}, it means that pj has known the lobels of 
n processes and the corresponding number of correct processes 
who have known each label. The deflnition of AP* is as 
follows: 
. AP*-completeness: There is a time after which ajp* 
permanently contains pairs of {label, number) associated 
to all correct processes. 
!We use the complement of a suspicion to describe strong completeness. 
. AP*-accuracy: I f a process crashes, the label of this 
process and the corresponding number to this label wi l l 
be permanently deleted from ajp*. 
More formally: 
S(label)T = {pi : (label, —) G a_p*T}. S(label)T is the set 
of all processes who have known label at time T. 
. AP*-completeness: 3T G N, Vp¿ G Correct, V T ' > T, 
y (label, number) G a_p*T : \S(label)T n Correct\ = 
number. 
, AP*-accuracy: Vp¿, pj G II, pi G Correct, pj G 
Faulty, 3T, VT > T: (labelJ, number J) <£ a_p*T . 
Note that eventually the number of pairs (label, number) 
output is equal to the number of correct processes. Moreover, 
the assignment of labels does not break the anonymity of 
the system, because labels are assigned and counted in the 
failure detector implementation, and no process knows the 
mapping relationship between labels and processes neither in 
the Reliable Broadcast layer ñor in the failure detector layer. 
B. Quiescent Reliable Broadcast Algorithm in 
AAS_Fn _ t [AP * ] 
With failure detector AP*, the flrst sub-problem (determin-
ing the set of all correct processes in the system) has been 
solved. The second sub-problem (conflrming that a message 
has been received by all correct processes) can be solved by 
making every process broadcast an “ACK” message when it 
receives a “MSG” message. Based on this, a quiescent Reliable 
Broadcast algorithm in AAS_Fnt[AP*] is given in Figure 2. 
Description of the algorithm: 
The algorithm works as follows. Now every process pi man-
ages four sets, initially empty: MSGi, RB_DELIVEREDi, 
MY_ACKi (which records all tag_ack generated by pi), 
and ALL_ACKi (which records all tag_ack received by 
Pi). Similarly to the algorithm of Figure 1, when pn calis 
RB_broadcasti(m) (line 4), its randomi() generates a ran-
dom tag for m flrstly (line 5). Then, pn inserts (m, tag) into 
MSGi (line 6), so that m wi l l be broadcast periodically to all 
processes in Task 1 (lines 49-51). 
When receivei(MSG, m, tag) is executed (line 7), Pi 
inserts (m, tag) into MSGi i f this is the flrst recep-
tion of m (lines 7-12). After that, pn inserts (m, tag) 
into RB_DELIVEREDi and generates a random tag_ack. 
Then, pn broadeasts a reception acknowledgment message of 
(m, tag), which is composed of both tag_ack and label 
information (read from a_p*). After that, pn delivers m (lines 
16-23). Otherwise, Le., if an acknowledgment message of (m, 
tag) is recorded in MY_ACKi (line 13), then it means that 
m has already been delivered by pn. In that case, pn just 
broadeasts the recorded acknowledgment message of (m, tag), 
but with the updated label information from ajp* (lines 14-
15). 
When process pn receives an acknowledgment message 
(ACK, m, tag, tag_ack, labelSj) from process pj (note that 
Pj could be pi itself), there are three cases to consider: 
1 Init ialization 
2 sets MSGi, RB_DELIVEREDi, MY_ACKi, ALL_ACKi empty 
3 actívate Task 1 
4When RB_broadcasti(m) is executed 
5 tag •<— randorriiQ 
6 inserí (va, tag) into MSGi 
7 When receivei(MSG, va, tag) is executed 
8 i f (va, tag) is not in MSGi then 
9 if (va, tag) is not in RB_DELIVEREDi 
10 inserí (va, í a g ) into MSGi 
11 end i f 
12 end i f 
13 i f (va, í a g , tag_ack) is in M i ^ _ A C i í i then 
14 labelsi <— {label \ {label, —) £ a_í>*} 
15 broadcasti{ACK, va, tag, tag_ack, l abéis i) 
16 else 
17 inserí (m, íag) into RB_DELIVEREDi 
18 tag_ack <— randorriiQ 
19 inserí ( m , í a g , tag_ack) into M i ^ _ A C i í i 
20 labelsi <— {label \ (label, —) £ a_í?*} 
21 broadcasti{AGK, va, tag, tag_ack, labelsi) 
22 RB _deliver i(va) 
23 end i f 
24 When r e c e - í v e ^ A C R ' , va, tag, tag_ack, labelSj) is executed 
25 i f ( m , í a g , —, —) is not in ALL_ACKi then 
26 allocate array label_counteri[{va, tag), — ] 
27 allocate array a n _ í a 6 e í s i [ ( m , íag) , —] 
28 end i f 
29 if {va, tag, tag_ack) is not in ALL_ACKi then 
30 inserí {va, tag, tag_ack) into ALL_ACKi 
31 all_label.Si[{va, tag), tag_ack] —^ label Sj 
32 for each label £ label Sj do 
33 label_countevi[{va, tag), label] —^ label_countevi[{va, tag), label] + 1 
34 end for 
35 else 
36 for each label in labelsj but not in an_íafeeísi[(?7i, íag ) , íag_acfc] do 
37 all_label.Si[{va, tag), tag_ack] —^ all_labéisi[{m, tag), tag_ack] U {label} 
38 label_couvitevi\iva, tag), label] ±— label_countevi[{va, tag), label] + 1 
39 end for 
40 for each label in all_labelsi[{va, tag), tag_ack] but not in labelsj do 
41 all_labelsi[{va, tag), tag_ack] —^ all_labelsi[{va, tag), tag_ack] \ label 
42 delete label_countevi[{va, tag), label] 
43 for each label in both all_labelsi[{va, tag), tag_ack] and labelsj do 
44 label_countevi[{va, tag), label] —^ label_countevi[{va, tag), label] - 1 
45 end for 
46 end for 
47 end i f 
48 Task 1: 










for every message {va, tag) in MSGi do 
bvoadcasti{MSG, va, tag) 
if each pair of (label, nuvabev) £ a_p*: label_countevi[(va, tag), label] = nuvabev A all_labéisi[(va, tag), —] = {label \ (label, —) £ a_p* 
} then 
if (va, tag) is in RB_DELIVEREDi then 
delete (va, tag) from MSGi 
end i f 
end i f 
end for 
end repeat 
Figure 2. Quiescent Reliable Broadcast in AAS F n , t [AP ] (code of p i) 
p i receives for the first time an acknowledgment message 
of (m, tag) (by checking whether (m, tag) is recorded or 
not in the set ALL ACK i ) , which also means that this 
is the first ACK message from process p j (one tag ack 
represents one process). In this case, p i allocates an array 
label counteri[(m, tag), - ] (used to record the number 
of processes who have known each label received in this 
ACK message and related to (m, tag)), and an array 
all labelsi[(m, tag), - ] (used to record every label in 
each ACK message related to (m, tag)) (lines 25-28). 
p i receives an ACK message coming from a new process 
(by checking whether (m, tag, tag ack) is recorded or 
not in ALL ACK i ) . (Observe that the previous case is 
naturally included in this case, but this case considers not 
only the very first ACK but later ACKs from others 
processes). In this case, p i first inserts (m, tag, tag ack) 
into ALL ACK i and labelsj into all labelsi[(m, tag), 
tag ack]. After that, for each received label in labelsj, 
p i increases its count number by 1 (1 means that every 
label is known by the process from which tag ack has 
been received) (lines 29-34). 
p i receives a repeated ACK message (with the same 
tag ack) (due to the periodical broadcast of messages 
to cope with fair lossy channels). There are two mutually 
exclusive cases: 1) repeated ACK w i th “more” (new) 
label information (lines 36-39); 2) repeated ACK w i th 
“less” label information (due to the accuracy property 
of AP*, that may need some time to delete a label 
corresponding to a crashed process) (lines 40-46). In case 
1, for each new label, pi inserís it into all_labelsi[(m, 
tag), tag_ack] and increases its count number by 1. In 
case 2, for each disappeared label, pi deletes i t f rom 
all_labelsi[(m, tag), tag_ack] and its corresponding 
label_counter. Then, pi decreases the count number of 
received labels by 1 (since i t was not accurate due to the 
ACK message f rom a faulty process). 
In Task 1, for each pair of (label, number) in ajp*, i f 
(1) the counted number of each label label_counteri [(m, tag), 
label] is equal to the corresponding output number o f ajp* 
(which means that pi has received number different ACKs 
(tag_ack) o f (m, tag)), and (2) the received labels related to 
(m, tag) all_labelsi[(m, tag), —] are equal to the output labels 
of a_p* {label | (label, —) G a_p*} (which means that the 
received ACKs are f rom correct processes) (line 52), together 
wi th the fact that (m, tag) has already been RB_delivered, 
then pi deletes (m, tag) f rom the MSGÍ set (line 54). 
Correctness Proof: 
Theorem 2. The algorithm of Figure 2 implements Reliable 
Broadcast quiescently in AAS_Fn¡t[AP*]. 
Proof: The proofs of the Validity, Agreement and Un i -
form Integrity properties of Reliable Broadcast are straight-
forward. We w i l l now prove the quiescence property of the 
algorithm of Figure 2. 
A n algorithm is said to be quiescent when eventually no 
process sends messages. In the algorithm of Figure 2, i t is 
obvious that the broadcast of ACK messages (lines 15 and 21) 
is caused by the reception of MSG messages (line 7). Henee, 
we only need to show that the number of broadeasts of MSG 
messages is imite. Moreover, by nature a faulty process can 
only broadcast a flnite number of times each MSG messages. 
Henee, the rest of the proof only focuses on showing that each 
correct process broadeasts a flnite number of times each MSG 
message. 
It is easy to see that the broadcast of MSG messages oceur 
only in Task 1. Let us consider two processes p (correct) and 
q, such that p broadeasts (MSG, m, tag) periodically by Task 
1. 
• I f q is correct, then eventually both p and q receive 
this MSG due to the fairness property of fair lossy 
communication channels. p RB_delivers m when i t 
receives MSG for the flrst t ime. Also, by the algorithm 
q broadeasts (ACK, m, tag, tag_ack, labelq) every t ime 
i t receives MSG. By the fairness property of channels, 
p w i l l receive some of those ACK messages. According 
to lines 29-47, p w i l l count every label in the received 
ACK f rom q, such that label_counterp[(m, tag), labelq] 
= 2 and label_counterp[(m, tag), labelp] = 2. From the 
properties of the failure detector AP*, the output of AP* 
is composed of label and number of correct processes, 
e.g., [(labelq, 2), (labelp, 2)]. Then, the condition of line 
52 is satisfied, and thus process p deletes (m, tag) from 
MSG i and the repeated broadcast of the MSG message 
is stopped, which proves that this case is quiescent. 
If q has crashed, then p will only receive ACK from 
• 
itself and together with the accuracy property of APp , 
the label and corresponding number of q will eventually 
and permanently be removed from the output of APp . 
Again, the condition of line 52 is satisfied, which proves 
that this case is quiescent too. 
The previous reasoning completes the proof of the quies-
cence property of the algorithm of Figure 2. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have studied the implementation of Reli-
able Broadcast in anonymous asynchronous message passing 
distributed systems with fair lossy communication channels. 
We have initially proposed a non-quiescent algorithm, proving 
that it is possible to implement R B in fair lossy anonymous 
distributed systems. In this first algorithm, each correct process 
has to broadcast all RB delivered messages forever in order 
to overcome the message losses caused by the fair lossy 
communication channels. Then, an anonymous perfect failure 
detector AP has been proposed, which allows stopping 
eventually the periodical broadcast in order to get a more 
practical quiescent R B algorithm. Finally, a quiescent R B 
algorithm is given in the fair lossy anonymous distributed 
system model enriched with AP . 
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